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Chapter I: Three Opposing Interpretations 
In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States 
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a 
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Over the 
past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly 
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the 
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation. 
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive, 
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of 
interpretation: the traditional perspective, the right-wing 
perspective, and the left-wing perspective. 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
is held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as 
well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous 
journalists and political scientists of the 1960s and 1970s. 
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter­
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at 
least three basic issues. First, there is a consensus among 
traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts in 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of 
serious miscalculations. The United States was operating under 
the mistaken conviction that Soviet foreign policy was too 
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in 
a country as close to the United States as Cuba. For the 
Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S. 
response to such an act. Second, traditionalists agree that 
President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity 
~ to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a 
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing 
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether 
this threat was a political or strategic one. The decision 
to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted 
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum 
1
risk of war. Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement 
in their praise of President Kennedy as a calm, rational and 
2
responsible leader. 
While the traditional interpretation is the most widely 
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also 
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the 
right and left-wings. The right-wing perspective of the missilet 
crisis was developed by conservative pOlitical scientists and 
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following 
the crisis. Although the right-wing perspective is not as 
unified as that of the traditionalists, there are several 
points of consensus. The conservatives are unanimous in their 
criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding 
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with 
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could 
successfully place missiles on the island. Once the crisis 
began, the general consensus among conservatives is that 
Kennedy followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the 
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action 
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States. 
-3­
The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro 
and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion 
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly 
3
what he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere. 
The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated 
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and 
political scientists. The liberal writers have developed a 
most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues. To 
the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a 
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need 
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the 
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus 
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the 
threat of nuclear war. According to the liberals, Soviet~ 
missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic 
but in the political balance of power, thereby placing the 
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear 
superiority of the United States at risk. Concluding that 
the missiles in Cuba were a pOlitical problem requiring a 
political sOlution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection 
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the 
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation 
between the two superpowers. The aftermath of the crisis for 
the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy 
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before 
4the world. 
Thus, participants, journalists, historians and political 
-

-4­
scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missilet 
crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum. 
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a 
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the 
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached. 
Chapter II: The Traditional Interpretation 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
~s considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the 
confrontation. It is shared by nearly all of the participants 
in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is, 
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the 
1960s and 1970s. Traditionalists concur in the belief that 
intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet 
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions. Within this 
interpretation there is also general agreement that the United 
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with 
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall 
nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexiblet 
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed 
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy. There is also agree­
ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by 
U.S. military stre~thwhich was the dominant factor in the 
Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition­
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication. 
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that 
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they 
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants 
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President 
1
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis. 
In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially 
t! respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is 
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Chapter I: Three Opposing Interpretations 
In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States 
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a 
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Over the 
past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly 
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the 
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation. 
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive, 
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of 
interpretation: the traditional perspective, the right-wing 
perspective, and the left-wing perspective. 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile cr1S1S 
1S held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as 
well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous 
journalists and pOlitical scientists of the 1960s and 1970s. 
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter­
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at 
least three basic issues. First, there is a consensus among 
traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts in 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of 
serious miscalculations. The United States was operating under 
the mistaken conviction that Soviet foreign policy was too 
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in 
a country as close to the United States as Cuba. For the 
Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S. 
response to such an act. Second, traditionalists agree that 
-2­
President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity 
t	 to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a 
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing 
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether 
this threat was a pOlitical or strategic one. The decision 
to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted 
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum 
1
riSk of	 war. Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement 
in their praise of	 President Kennedy as a calm, rational and 
2
responsible leader. 
While the traditional interpretation is the most widely 
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also 
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the 
right and left-wings. The right-wing perspective of the missile ~: 
crisis	 was developed by conservative political scientists and 
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following 
the crisis. Although the right-wing perspective is not as 
unified	 as that of the traditionalists, there are several 
points of consensus. The conservatives are unanimous in their 
criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding 
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with 
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could 
successfully place	 missiles on the island. Once the crisis 
began,	 the general consensus among conservatives is that 
Kennedy	 followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the 
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action 
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States. 
The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro 
-
and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion 
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly 
3
what	 he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere. 
The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated 
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and 
political scientists. The liberal writers have developed a 
most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues. To 
the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a 
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need 
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the 
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus 
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the 
threat of nuclear war. According to the liberals, Soviet 
missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic 
but in the pOlitical balance of power, thereby placing the 
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear 
superiority of the United States at risk. Concluding that 
the missiles in Cuba were a pOlitical problem requiring a 
political solution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection 
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the 
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation 
between the two superpowers. The aftermath of the crisis for 
the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy 
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before 
4the world. 
Thus, participants, journalists, historians and pOlitical 
-4­
scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missile 
t crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum. 
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a 
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the 
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached. 
t
 
Chapter II: The Traditional Interpretation 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
is considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the 
confrontation. It is shared by nearly all of the participants 
in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is, 
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the 
1960s and 1970s. Traditionalists concur in the belief that 
intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet 
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions. Within this 
interpretation there is also general agreement that the United 
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with 
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall 
nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexible
,t 
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed 
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy. There is also agree­
ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by 
U.S. military stre~thwhich was the dominant factor in the 
Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition­
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication. 
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that 
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they 
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants 
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President 
1
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis. 
In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially 
respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is 
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Chapter I: Three Opposing Interpretations 
In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States 
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a 
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Over the 
past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly 
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the 
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation. 
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive, 
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of 
interpretation: the traditional perspective, the right-wing 
perspective, and the left-wing perspective. 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
lS held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as 
well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous 
journalists and pOlitical scientists of the 1960s and 1970s. 
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter­
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at 
least three basic issues. First, there is a consensus among 
traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts In 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of 
serious miscalculations. The United States was operating under 
the mistaken conviction that soviet foreign policy was too 
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in 
a country as close to the United States as Cuba. For the 
Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S. 
response to such an act. Second, traditionalists agree that 
-2­
President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity 
to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a 
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing 
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether 
this threat was a political or strategic one. The decision 
to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted 
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum 
l
risk of war. Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement 
in their praise of President Kennedy as a calm, rational and 
2
responsible leader. 
While the traditional interpretation is the most widely 
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also 
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the 
right and left-wings. The right-wing perspective of the missile 
-
crisis was developed by conservative political scientists and 
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following 
the crisis. Although the right-wing perspective is not as 
unified as that of the traditionalists, there are several 
points of consensus. The conservatives are unanimous in their 
criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding 
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with 
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could 
successfully place missiles on the island. Once the crisis 
began, the general consensus among conservatives is that 
Kennedy followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the 
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action 
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States. 
-3­
The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro 
and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion 
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly 
3
what he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere. 
The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated 
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and 
political scientists. The liberal writers have developed a 
most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues. To 
the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a 
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need 
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the 
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus 
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the 
threat of nuclear war. According to the liberals, Soviet 
missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic 
but in the political balance of power, thereby placing the 
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear 
superiority of the United States at risk. Concluding that 
the missiles in Cuba were a POlitical problem requiring a 
political solution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection 
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the 
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation 
between the two superpowers. The aftermath of the crisis for 
the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy 
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before 
4the world. 
Thus, participants, journalists, historians and political 
-4­
scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missile 
crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum. 
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a 
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the 
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached. 
t
 
Chapter II: The Traditional Interpretation 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
is considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the 
confrontation. It is shared by nearly all of the participants 
in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is, 
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the 
1960s and 1970s. Traditionalists concur in the belief that 
intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet 
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions. Within this 
interpretation there is also general agreement that the United 
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with 
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall 
nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexible 
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed 
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy. There is also agree­
ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by 
U.S. military stre~thwhich was the dominant factor in the 
Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition­
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication. 
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that 
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they 
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants 
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President 
1
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis. 
In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially 
respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is 
-6­
necessary to understand the various options which Kennedy 
and his advisers considered and their reasons for settling
-
on the blockade course. The story of the Cuban missile crisis 
has been exhaustively told; however, the accounts which are 
essential to comprehending the decision process which took 
place during those thirteen days are best told by the participants 
themselves. 
President Kennedy viewed Cuba as perhaps his most pressing 
foreign policy problem; yet, while he was aware of increased 
Soviet military aid to Castro, he did not have enough evidence 
to confront the Soviets, as some conservative congressmen 
urged him to do. However, in statements on September 4 and 13, 
the President warned that, while at this time there was no 
evidence of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground nuclear 
mi ssiles in Cuba, "the gravest of issues would arise" if this 
2
situation were to change. While there was some controversy 
regarding the definition of offensive as opposed to defensive 
missiles, it is apparent that Kennedy was referring to missiles 
which could be launched in an attack against the United States. 
For their part, the Soviets maintained in a September 11 
statement released on the Soviet news agency TASS that the 
armaments in Cuba were strictly defensive, as the nuclear 
weapons within the Soviet union were so powerful that there 
was "no need to search for sites for them beyond the bounda rie s 
of the Soviet union.,,3 
Aware of the potential for trouble in Cuba, Kennedy had 
increased the number of U-2 flights over the iSland. On 
-7­
Sunday mornjng, October 14, Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson, 
who a week later would be shot down and killed on a similar 
mission, flew the U-2 flight which provided the vital evidence. 
By Monday afternoon photographic experts had determined that 
In the San Cristobal area of western Cuba there existed the 
4
crude beginnings of a base for medium-range ballistic missiles. 
It was deemed most expedient to allow the President a restful 
njght before facing the imminent crisis, so White House Aide 
McGeorge Bundy waited until the next morning to inform Kennedy 
of the photographs. While many have characterized Kennedy's 
initial reaction as one of surprise, a more accurate description 
may be that of startled anger, as conveyed by his exclamation: 
"He can't do this to me!,,5 Despite his initial shock, Kennedy 
quickly ordered a meeting at 11:45 that morning of what would 
eventually become the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the 
National Security Council. The following men were assembled 
by the President, having little in common except Kennedy's 
desire for their judgment: 
Department of State: Secretary Dean Rusk, Under 
Secretary George Ball, Latin American Assistant 
Secretary Edwin Martin, Deputy Under Secretary 
Alexis Johnson, and Soviet expert Llewellyn 
Thompson. (Participating until departing for 
his new post as Ambassador to France the following 
nj ght was Charles "Chip" Bohlen.) 
Department of Defense: Secretary Robert McNamara, 
Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze and General Maxwell 
Taylor (newly appointed Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.) 
CIA: On the first day, Deputy Director CArter; 
thereafter, (upon his return to Washington), 
Director John McCone. 
-8­
Other: Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Treasury 
Secretary Douglas Dillon, Whjte House Aides 
McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorenson. (Also 
sitting in on the earlier and later meetings 
in the White House were the Vice President 
and Kenneth O'Donnell. Others--such as 
Dean Acheson, Adlai Stevenson and Robert 
Lovett--sat in from time to time; and six 
days later USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson, 
acting for the ailing Edward R. Murrow, was 
officiallyadded.)6 
At their first meeting the ExComm members outlined six 
possible courses of action, with four of them being eliminated 
relatively quickly. The first two options were diplomatic 
approaches: to do nothing, or to use diplomatic pressure on 
the Soviets, either through the United Nations or with a direct 
approach to Khrushchev. There was some support for the use 
of diplomacy as an initial response, with the strongest 
advocate being Adlai Stevenson, who proposed either presenting 
the situation to the United Nations Security Councilor 
offering a deal to the Soviets--we would withdraw our missiles 
from Turkey and Italy and give up our naval base at Guantanamo 
7Bay in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal of missiles in cuba. 
Moreover, before departing for France, Charles Bohlen strongly 
urged the President to use diplomacy as an initial response 
.. 8to t h e crlS1S. Indeed, most evidence indicates that there 
was some consideration given to the diplomatic proposals in 
the ExComm meetings; after all, some reasoned, we expected the 
Soviets to live with our missiles in Turkdy, and by downplaying 
the situation we could prevent the Soviets from inflating 
the importance of the missiles. 9 Additionally, as Robert 
McNamara initially pointed out, we already lived in the range 
-9­
of Soviet missiles: "A missile is a missile--it makes no 
great difference whether you are killed by a missile fired 
.. b 10 .from the Sovlet Unlon or from Cu a." However, the Presldent 
disagreed with this line of reasoning, maintaining that, while 
the missiles may not substantially alter the strategic balance 
in fact, that balance would have been substantially altered 
in appearance, and in matters of national will and world 
leadership, such appearances contribute to reality.II For 
Kennedy, these missiles represented a change in the political 
strategic balance and a challenge to his previous warnings; 
to do nothing would render American committments invalid. 
Perhaps the most important factor in the President's 
refusal to consider diplomatic options was concern over political 
repercussions. Although many analysts of the Cuban missile 
crisis point to apprehension regarding the outcome of the 
November election as a factor in the President's decision, 
it is quite possible that Kennedy was more concerned with the 
possible loss of popular support for himself if the crisis 
was not resolved quickly. The popular outcry over Soviet 
missiles ninety miles off of our shores could have been so 
great as to cripple Kennedy as President; therefore, he felt 
compelled to react quickly and firmly. 
Other considerations against the diplomatic approach 
included the suspicion that this move by the Soviets could be 
merely the first step in a larger plan, the possibility that 
the missiles could become operational while a diplomatic debate 
ensued, and the unwillingness to allow Khrushchev to seize 
-10­
the initiative in a situation which Kennedy wanted to control. 12 
The only other diplomatic option which was proposed was a 
plan to secretly approach Castro in an effort to convince him 
that he should remove the missiles himself because Khrushchev 
was planning to double-cross him, thereby also creating a split 
, 13between Havana and Moscow. However, Kennedy thought even 
less of this option than the other diplomatic proposals, and 
he confided to Bohlen his disappointment in the unimaginative 
' 14 
approaches comlng from the State Department. 
The final option which was fairly quickly eliminated 
from consideration, at least as an initial response, was an 
., b 15lnvaSlon of Cu a. An invasion was viewed by most participants 
as a last-step alternative, mainly because it would involve 
the greatest risk for either world war or for retaliation 
against United States allies. There were also several secondary 
considerations which persuaded most ExComm members that a more 
reserved initial response was appropriate. Many were worried 
about the general frame of mind of the Soviets. The Russians 
had already made one serious miscalculation by installing the 
missiles in Cuba, apparently underestimating the U.S. response; 
Khrushchev's tendency to react impulsively in certain situations. 
a Cuban invasion could trigger a devastating reaction. Ambassador 
Thompson emphasized this point by warning the group og 
16 
There was also concern regarding the possibility that 
Khrushchev was trying to provoke an attack on Cuba in order 
to facilitate a move on Berlin, coupled with the general aware­
17 
neww of the difficulties in halting escalation once it has begun. 
-11­
While concern about the reactions from our European 
allies to whichever course of action was chosen was not a 
primary factor, these considerations nevertheless contributed 
to the downfall of both the invasion proposal and the diplomatic 
options. On the one hand, if the United States had invaded~ 
Cuba, Europe may have felt that we were overreacting to the 
situation; they cared little about Cuba and had long accustomed 
themselves to living next door to Soviet missiles. On the 
other hand, there was concern among ExComm members that no 
response from the United States would trigger fear among the 
allies that the United States was weak; if we did not stand 
up to threats in our own backyard, what were the chances of 
. , . . ?18 
our rlslng to a Sovlet challenge In Europe. 
Although throughout that week of ExComm meetings Kennedy's 
advisers would return to any and all of the proposed options, 
the debate eventually came to focus on two proposals. First, 
an air strike against Cuba, either restricted to the missile 
strikes (the "surgical strike") or including other military 
targets as well, with or without warning. Second, the implemen­
tation of a naval blockade on the island, with a wide range 
. h' lnclu'de d b lockad e ' 19of ltems w lch could be on the llSt. 
Ensuing debate over these two options was more or less dictated 
by what came to be the general goal of most of the President's 
advisers: defining the proper economy of force that would 
insure the quick dismantling of the sites with the least 
. 'h00d of retallatlon... 20llkell 
Early in the week, support was strongest for the air strike; 
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the goal was to eliminate the missiles, and the idea of a 
"surgical ll air strike, quickly and effectively removing the 
missiles, was appealing. Indeed, according to Robert Kennedy, 
liThe general feeling in the beginning was that some form of 
action was required .... Most felt, at that stage, that an air 
21
strike against the missiles could be the only course. Yet 
support for the air strike gradually faded. There were the 
ever-present concerns regarding the reactions of our allies; 
the Latin American experts warned that a massive air strike, 
potentially killing thousands of Cubans, would permanently 
damage the United States in the hemisphere, and the European 
experts said Europe would regard a surprise attack as an 
h wexceSSlve. response. 22 However, t ere were two factors h'lch 
were decisive in Kennedy's decision to implement the blockade 
instead of the air strike: first, the argument from morality 
and tradition that the United States could not perpetrate 
a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," and, second, the realization that 
II ' ..' , , , 23a surglcal alr strlke was lmposslble. 
The moral argument against an air strike was presented 
passionately by the Attorney General, who pursuasively insisted 
that an attack without warning at dawn that Sunday would be 
a "Pearl Harbor in reverse, and it would blacken the name of 
24the United States in the pages of history. 11 Some air strike 
advocates proposed an air strike with a warning, but Sorenson, 
President Kennedy's chief speech writer, could not draft a 
suitable statement: IINo matter how many references I put in 
to a summit, to peaceful intentions and to previous warnlngs 
-13­
and pledges, the letter still sounded like an ultimatum no 
25 ' h h .great power could accept. II Yet, accordlng to Art ur Sc leslnger, 
Jr., in retrospect most participants regarded Robert Kennedy's 
. , . , h d ' . 26speech as the cruclal turnlng pOlnt ln t e eC1Slon process. 
However, in the President's mind the realization that an 
alr strike could not be surgical was perhaps an even greater 
factor in his decision than the morality argument. The military 
advisers maintained that an air strike could not be limited 
to the missile sites alone; other military areas would have 
to be targeted in order to protect American fighters. Such 
an attack would undoubtedly result in the deaths of many 
Soviets as well as Cubans, leaving Khrushchev no alternative 
,. 27but to retallate ln some manner. Just as important for 
Kennedy was the fact that, even with a massive air attack, 
there was no guarantee that all of the missiles would be 
h' .d 28 Th us, t e alr strlke. falle d to meet the goal ofremove.
 
removing the missiles from Cuba.
 
On the other hand, Kennedy's ultimate choice, the naval 
blockade or, as he termed it, the quarantine, also did not 
meet this goal; indeed, there originally had been very little 
support for a blockade. It appeared to be almost irrelevant 
to the problem, as it provided no method of getting the missiles 
29
out of Cuba. Moreover, opponents argued that a blockade 
would not exert the pressure required to convince Khrushchev 
to remove the missiles and would also permit work to continue 
on t h e sltes,' . , result woul d be anoth er MunlC. h . 30lmplylng that the 
Some air strike advocates reasonably pointed out that if the 
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Soviets chose to ignore the blockade the United States would 
be forced to fire, Soviets would be killed, and Khrushchev 
would be forced to retaliate. This was the same argument used 
against the air strike, only in this case it would come without 
. h ., 31. ht h e beneflt of t e removal of the mlSSlles. Flnally, t ere 
was the contention that the obvious response to a blockade 
of Cuba would be a Soviet blockade of Berlin. 32 This fear went 
back to the theory that the deployment of missiles in Cuba 
was merely a ruse for the Soviets to make a move in Berlin, 
and many of Kennedy's advisers warned that a blockade of Cuba 
would merely invite Khrushchev to respond in kind in Berlin. 
Despite these difficulties, the blockade proposal event­
ually drew the support of a majority of the ExComm members and 
of the President. The most attractive aspect of the blockade 
for Kennedy was that it was a flexible response, allowing 
Khrushchev time to reconsider his actions and leaving the door 
, h d' , 33open for a retreat Wlt 19n1ty. Also crucial for the President 
was the fact that, as an initial step, the blockade served 
as an instrument of intensifying pressure, either by adding 
such items as "POL" (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to the 
initial blockade list of only offensive weapons, or by moving 
up the military ladder of escalation to an air strike, or even 
. . 34 h d ' h' ,an lnvaSlon. In ot er wor s, unllke t e alr strlke, the 
blockade did not eliminate as many options for future action. 
There were other less decisive but still important attributes 
of the blockade course. It could be legitimized, to a certain 
degree, by the support of the Organization of American States, 
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which did in fact unanimously vote in favor of the United States 
action the following week. Finally, a blockade was more likely 
to avoid the condemnation of world opinion, which almost certainly 
would have resulted from a surprise attack by the United States 
3S 
on Cuba. 
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile cr1S1S 
1S put forth by both participants in the Kennedy administration 
and contemporary observers; however, as a group, the former 
members of the Kennedy administration are both the most prolific 
writers on the crisis and the staunchest supporters of 
President Kennedy. 
One of the earliest traditional interpretations by a 
Kennedy official was by Theodore Sorenson, whose book Kennedy 
was published in 1968. Sorenson was a White House Aide to 
the President, and a key participant in the ExComm meetings. 
He is unwavering in his praise for Kennedy's actions during 
the crisis, summing up his opinion with a quotation from 
Kennedy's Profiles in Courage: "He may live long, he may do 
much. But this is the summit. He never can exceed what he 
d 36 " ,does t h1S' ay." In hlS analys1s Sorenson emphaslzes the 
miscalculations made by both the United States and Soviet intell­
igence experts. United States intelligence believed Soviet 
foreign policy to be too cautious to risk placing ballistic 
missiles in Castro's Cuba, and the Soviets were guilty of 
underestimating the United States reaction to such a move. 
Moreover, Sorenson maintains that President Kennedy was 
compelled to respond to the missiles because they would 
"materially ... and politically change the balance of power" 
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37ln the Cold War. Sorenson strongly advocated a blockade as 
the best option for the United States, because it was a limited 
military action which permitted a more controlled escalation 
on our part, yet was less likely to precipitate war than an 
, ,38 h K d d" kalr strlke. T us, for Sorenson, enne y's eCJS10n struc 
the perfect balance between doing too much and not doing enough: 
"He had reassured those nations fearing we would use too much 
strength and those fearing we would use none at all. He had, 
as Harold Macmillan would later say, earned his place in 
h ' b y t h'1S one act alone." 39lstory 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk provided his traditional 
interpretation of the crisis twenty years after the event, in 
an annlversary article for Time. Like other traditionalists, 
Rusk commends Kennedy and the choice of a limited response in 
the form of a blockade. He also places considerable emphasis 
on the role of secret diplomacy in the resolution of the crisis: 
"The political and military pressure created by the quarantine 
was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant 
means of communication with both our friends and our adver­
saries.,,40 Indeed, Rusk points to the implicit promise of 
Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the 
removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey as a crucial factor 
. h " , , 41ln t e termlnatlon of the crlS1S. 
Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
McGeorge Bundy, who wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in 
1964, stresses the importance of military factors over diplomatic 
ones in the resolution of the crisis, stating that "the armed 
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strength of the United States, if handled with firmness and 
42prudence, lS a great force for peace. Although during the 
preliminary ExComm meetings Bundy favored the use of a diplomatic 
appeal to resolve the crisis, he eventually came to be an 
advocate of an air strike against Cuba. Despite this, his 
praise for President Kennedy is unwavering, placing him in 
the traditional camp: "A further element of strength in this 
crisis was the firmness and clarity of the Presidential 
decision to insist on the withdrawal of the missiles .... The 
strength of this position, like the strength of the available 
military force, was reinforced by its disciplined relation 
. . 43 . .. .to a pOllCy of restralnt." Whlle never stated ln expllclt 
terms, Bundy implies that it was the combined conventional 
and nuclear strength of the United States coupled with the 
President's willingness to risk nuclear war that affected a 
peaceful . 44 However, ln. an lssue t h' present ySolutlon. . at 1S 1 
the source of great debate, other traditionalists hold that 
Kennedy was not as willing to risk nuclear war as Bundy claims. 
with Sorenson insisting that if the quarantine had failed 
the President "would not have moved immediately to either an 
air strike or an invasion. 1I45 This disagreement over Kennedy's 
willingness to risk nuclear war and the role of diplomacy 1n 
resolving the crisis is the major point of conflict among 
traditionalists. 
The recollections of Kennedy's Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, are put forth in his 
book Swords and Plowshares, and generally agree with those 
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of Bundy. Taylor was the strongest air strike advocate among 
ExComm members, believing that it was essential to remove 
the missiles before they became operational. While he acknow­
ledged that not all of the missiles would be destroyed in an 
air strike, he felt that "there was reason to hope that this 
demonstration of American determination, followed by a blockade 
of Cuba and preparation for an invasion of the island, would 
bring Khrushchev to his senses and induce him to liquidate 
this rash venture. ,,46 Obviously, other ExComm members did 
not share Taylor's willingness to base their decision on the 
"hope" that such action would induce Khrushchev to remove the 
missiles. Yet Taylor maintains that the reason he supported 
the air strike was his belief that a blockade would eventually 
necessitate either an invasion of Cuba, an option he felt the 
United States could not afford either pOlitically or militarily, 
'd h" 47or backlng own from t e sltuatlon. In accordance with 
other traditionalists, Taylor does stress the miscalculations 
of intelligence experts, contributing these on the American 
side to the profusion of rumors and the confusion over the 
deflnltlon' , , of offenslve'dan d' weapons. 48 Also, t heefenslve 
fact that Taylor offers nothing but praise for Kennedy's 
handling of the crisis, maintaining that in making his decision 
"President Kennedy behaved as any responsible leader is likely 
to do in a crisis in the nuclear age," puts him in the trad­
, . . 49 . d hltlonal perspectlve. However, Taylor agrees wlth Bun y t at 
it was not diplomatic manuevering but "the growing impatience 
of the President backed by his formidable invasion force ready 
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, , h d ' , 50to strIke" WhlC resolve the crISIS. 
Although not intimately involved in the decision process, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., as Special Assistant to President 
Kennedy and a member of the United States delegation to the 
United Nations during the crisis, offers a strong traditional 
interpretation of the confrontation. According to Schlesinger, 
the United States intelligence experts grossly miscalculated 
Soviet intentions in Cuba, considering Soviet policy too 
rational for such a risky venture. Khrushchev, Schlesinger 
reasons, must have considered the risk worthwhile in that it 
would destroy the world's trust in United States resolve and 
protection. 51 Schlesinger also supports the traditional view 
that Kennedy had no alternative than to insist on the removal 
of the missiles. To do nothing would have been "a stunning 
vindication of the Soviet 'Cold War of movement' ... and would 
52have produced a shattering reaction in the United States ... 
Indeed, nearly all in the Kennedy administration shared this 
view, including the President and the Attorney General: "If 
you hadn't acted, .. Robert Kennedy told his brother, "you 
would have been impeached." The President said, "That's what 
53I think--I would have been impeached ... Schlesinger also 
emphasizes the importance of diplomacy, particularly the pledge 
made by Robert Kennedy to Dobrynin, as being crucial to termin­
ating the crisis, after having first created a military 
'h d ,. 54settIng t at woul Insure ItS success. Thus, Schlesinger 
applauds the flexibility of the quarantine, the willingness 
to keep communication lines open, and the firm resolve of 
-----
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Kennedy: "It was this combination of toughness and restraint, 
of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so 
matchlessly calibrated, that dazzled the world.,,55 
Roger Hilsman was the Djrector of Intelligence and Research 
for the State Department under President Kennedy, and his 
account of the Cuban missile crisis in To Move A Nation combines 
several of the perspectives previously discussed by tradition­
alists. Hilsman stresses the miscalculations of intelligence 
experts on both sides, pointing to the belief in the United 
States that the high probability that the U.S. would discover 
missiles placed in Cuba combined with the instability of 
Castro's regime seemingly made the installation of ballistic 
missiles in Cuba highly unlikely.56 He also maintains that 
the Soviets completely underestimated the range of probable 
u.S. responses. Moreover, Hilsman claims that it was the 
suddenness of Khrushchev's action and the subsequent change 
in the status quo which demanded a response to the crisis. 
His praise of the course of action chosen is virtually uncond­
itional: "The keynote of the United States response was 
flexibility and self-disciplined restraint--a graduated effort 
which avoided trying to achieve too much and which stopped 
short of confronting an adversary with stark and imperative 
. 57, . h b' dChOl ces. " In Hllsman I s assessment, l t wa s t e com lne 
threat of United States conventional and nuclear power that 
convinced the Soviets to remove the missiles, placing him in 
agreement with Bundy and Taylor. In accordance with the general 
traditional interpretation by participants, Hilsman stresses 
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not only the management skills Kennedy displayed during the 
crisis but also his "inner calmness, a slightly detached, 
cool and objective view of himself and those around him that 
freed him from compulsiveness," which cUlminated, in Hilman's 
., , P 'd h d d 58opInIon, In a reSl ent w 0 was a lea er an a hero. 
Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council 
of the State Department during the Dennedy years, agrees with 
the consensus of the traditional interpretation. For him, 
the genius of Kennedy's blockade was that it required Khrushchev 
to initiate military action; indeed, he states that it was 
even possible that Khrushchev never anticipated a quarantine 
as an option for Kennedy--an error attributable to intelligence 
, . 59 h" 'dmIscalculatIons. In IS praIse of the PreSl ent, Rostow 
notes that history will forever "record that Kennedy presided 
over the virtually bloodless Gettysburg of the Cold War in 
.bb' 9 60the Carl ean In October 1 62." 
The traditional participants form a fairly cohesive 
perspective, concurring on most points. Most agree that there 
were gross miscalculations by intelligence experts on both 
sides. All agree that the missiles altered the balance of 
power In an area of vital concern to the United States, although 
t.here is disagreement over whether this was a strategjc or 
a political imbalance. Regardless, such a sudden change in 
~he status quo left President Kennedy no other option than to 
act. The choice of a quarantine receives nearly unanimous 
support from the participants, and even air strike advocates 
Bundy and Taylor praise the President's final decision to choose 
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a flexible response. Several traditionalists, including Bundy, 
Taylor and Hilsman, contend that it was the combined conventional 
and nuclear military threat of the United States which resolved 
the crisis, while others, like Sorenson, Rusk and Schlesinger, 
say that the military created a setting for diplomacy to be 
the effective factor in ending the crisis. For all traditional 
participants, however, the Cuban missile crisis was Kennedy's 
finest hour, as illustrated by the following tribute to Kennedy, 
whose authors include Rusk, McNamara, Sorenson and Bundy: 
We may be forgiven, however, if we give the last 
and highest word of honor to our own President, whose 
cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated 
compassion and, above all, continuously attentive 
control of our options and actions brilliantly served 
his country and all of mankind. 61 
It is this type of effusive, emotional praise which is 
the essential difference between the traditionalists writing 
from the participants' perspective and those writing from the 
observers' perspective. Although the observers of the crisis 
are a diverse group, consisting of journalists who covered 
the confrontation and pOlitical scientists who wrote in the 
1960s and 1970s, they present essentially the same perspective. 
There is also a consensus wi.th the participants' perspective 
in at least three major areas. First, both groups agree that 
there were serious miscalculations by intelligence in both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Second, both agree that 
offensive missiles in Cuba would have altered the balance of 
power; therefore, President Kennedy was required to take action 
to preserve the status quo and United States credibility. Third, 
both participants and observers emphasize that Kennedy acted 
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responsibly throughout the crisis, with participants stressing 
his calm and cool demeanor and observers accentuating his ability 
.. 62to manage t h e crlS1S. 
The earliest traditional interpretation by observers of 
the crisis was put forth in December of 1962 in a Saturday 
Evening Post article by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, 
both journalistic advocates of a firm U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union. As the first traditional interpretation of the 
crisis, this article is noteworthy in several respects. Alsop 
and Bartlett were the first to identify advocates of the alr 
strike as "hawks" and advocates of the blockade as "doves," 
· d . 63t h us sett lng a prece ent for future wrlters. In accordance 
with other traditionalists, both journalists maintain that 
offensive missiles in Cuba would have altered both the strategic 
and pOlitical balance of power, though they contend that it 
was the political significance of the Soviet action which was 
most crucial for the President and his advisers. "If they'd 
got away with this one," said one member of EXCOITUn, "we'd have 
been a paper tiger, a second-class power.,,64 Although Alsop 
and Bartlett caution against the belief that the crisis proved 
that the Soviets would always back down in a nuclear confronta­
tion, they do assert that the crisis showed that the Soviets 
would make concessions if the United States responded firmly 
. . . d 65. hwh en ltS vltal lnterests were threatene. Flnally, t e two 
journalists also stress the responsible leadership of the Pres­
ident, praising the fact that, in the words of an ExCoITUn member, 
"he never lost his nerve": "This must be counted a huge intangible 
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plus. A President's nerve is the essential factor when two 
66great nuclear powers are 'eyeball to eyeball. III 
While Kennedy's actions met with approval initially, 
criticisms eventually arose from both the left and the right-
wings of the political spectrum. It was partiallY In response 
to these critics that Bartlett teamed with Newsweek correspondent 
Edward Weinstal in 1967 in writing the book Facing the Brink. 
A main criticism from those on the left was the claim that 
Kennedy escalated a confrontation with the Soviets in order to 
boost Democratic gains in the November Congressional elections. 
In response, Weinstal and Bartlett maintain that "He (Kennedy) 
was so deeply aroused by the hazards of the confrontation and 
its peace-or-war implications that even at close range he seemed 
67beyond concern for the elections .... Weinstal and Bartlett11 
also answer charges from those on the right who contended 
that Kennedy overstated the danger of nuclear war, and therefore 
foreclosed seeking a decisive u.s. victory by the eradication 
of communism in Cuba. While the two journalists admit that, 
In retrospect, Kennedy did have the leverage to "tighten the 
screws" on Khrushchev, they also point out that "the President 
did not have the comfortable vantage-point of hindsight. 
Neither he nor any of his advisers could foresee how rationally 
68the Soviet leaders would behave when faced with retreat. 11 
They also emphasize the concern over possible reprisals in 
Berlin and the desire to negotiate peace with Khrushchev after 
the crisis: "He could not mortify the man and hope to deal 
, . h h' 69constructlvely Wlt lm later." Finally, Weinstal and Barrlett 
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praise Kennedy's responsible leadership during the crisis, 
particularly his ability to place himself in Khrushchev's shoes 
in order to determine how the Soviet leader would react to a 
, . , 70glven sltuatlon. 
One of the most widely-read overviews of the missile crisis 
was written in 1966 by Elie Abel, a former foreign correspondent 
for the New York Times. Like other traditionalists, Abel 
stresses the miscalculations of intelligence experts in both 
countries. For Americans, the crucial error was the inability 
to consider the possibility of the Soviets placing offensive 
missiles in Cuba, while the Soviets gravely underestimated 
' 71Kenned y's rea d lness to act. Abel also maintains that Kennedy 
was superb in the crisis, behaving both carefully and rationally 
, , d d 72 hIn "steerlng a safe course between war an surren er." T e 
decision to impose a quarantine was wisest, according to Abel, 
because it allowed the President's policy of brinksmanship to 
be successful: "The President's crucial achievement, once the 
crisis had started, was to make Khrushchev understand that he 
must withdraw--by showing him the nuclear abyss, to the edge 
of which he had blundered, and pointing a way back without 
disgrace. ,,73 
Taken together, the perspectives of traditionalists writing 
as both participants and as observers form a cohesive interpre­
tation. There is agreement regarding the failure of intelligence 
on both sides. The Soviets mistakenly thought that the United 
States would accept offensive missiles in Cuba as a fait accompli, 
therefore underestimating the determined response of Kennedy, 
while Americans wrongly assumed that the Soviets would continue 
their policy of not placing offensive missiles outside of its 
borders. There is also a consensus in the belief that nuclear 
missiles in Cuba would alter the balance of power--either strate­
gicallY or politically--thereby affecting u.s. interests and 
necessitating a response in order to maintain the status quo. 
Finally, there is agreement among traditionalists that Kennedy 
skillfully managed the art of brinksmanship, reacting calmly 
and rationally by striking a balance between exerting too much 
pressure and not exerting enough, with participants pla~ing 
greater emphasis on the personal qualities of the President 
than observers, who stress his management skills. 
Chapter III: The Right-Wing Interpretation 
The right-wing interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
~s in sharp contrast with that of the traditionalists. The 
group of writers advocating a conservative perspective ~s com­
prised mainly of conservative academicians and exiled Cubans, 
writing almost exclusively within the decade following the 
1
confrontation. Although collectively the right wing interpre­
ters do not form an interpretation as cohesive as that of the 
traditionalists, there is a general agreement on some issues. 
Most of those writing from the right-wing perspective maintain 
that Kennedy was at least partially to blame for the crisis 
because his lack of resolve in foreign policy, as exhibited 
in the Berlin Wall crisis and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, convinced 
Khrushchev that he could successfully deploy missiles in Cuba. 
Moreover, Kennedy was too anxious to deal with Khrushchev, 
adopting a policy of conciliation despite the overwhelming 
military superiority of the United States. For the conservatives, 
the resolution of the crisis was not Kennedy's finest hour. 
Instead, presented with a golden opportunity to wipe out Castro 
and communism in Cuba, Kennedy's actions, in Richard Nixon's 
words, "enabled the United states to pull defeat out of the 
jaws of victory.rr 2 In addition, say the conservative critics, 
the Soviets remain in Cuba, and the missiles may remain as well, 
3hidden in Cuban caves. 
The right-wing interpretation of the missile cr~s~s was 
initiated by David Lowenthal, a professor of political science 
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at Wheaton College, in an article for National Review in January 
1963. Lowenthal cites Kennedy's weak Cuban policy following 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961 as courting disaster, 
because it gave Khrushchev the confidence to send missiles to 
Cuba, thus allowing Cuba to become the hemisphere's third strong­
4
est military power. Furthermore, Lowenthal maintains that 
the demand for the removal of all offensive missiles in Cuba, 
to be enforced by the quarantine, was the bare minimal option 
open to the President, and even this pOlicy was pursued weakly.5 
Although Lowenthal sharply criticizes President Kennedy, he 
does allow that the primary fault lies not with individuals or 
pOlitical parties but with the philosophy of international 
affairs which dominates the country: we refuse to use coercion 
for moral ends, and retaliation never even enters our minds as 
. . 6 h h ' a vlable alternatlve. Lowenthal's ars est commentary lS 
directed at Kennedy's no-invasion pledge, which he interprets 
as a "guarantee that Communist penetration into this hemisphere 
has the right to exist if it shows no sign of military aggres­
, 7 d'Slon." Thus, Lowenthal concludes that Kenne y "made cOnceSSlons 
that will assist the growth of Communist military power and 
subversion in this hemisphere .... Nothing closer to an explicit 
retraction of the Monroe Doctrine has ever been made by any 
8President. 11 
A more moderate right-wing interpretation of the crlSlS 
was proposed by James Daniel and John Hubbell in Strike in the 
West, the first fUll-length book on the missile crisis, published 
in 1963. Daniel and Hubbell sharply criticize intelligence 
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experts and the State Department for brushing aside reports of 
the Soviet offensive military build-up in Cuba: "Before October 
16th, Americans could take little pride or comfort--and discover 
no logic--in their government's lack of recognition of the 
threat from Cuba. ,,9 However, in a deviation from most right-
wing interpreters, Daniel and Hubbell hold that, once the 
missiles were discovered, Kennedy reacted admirably. They 
praise Kennedy's policy of exerting pressure on Khrushchev 
while at the same time exercising restraint by allowing the 
Premier time to withdraw at each stage of the crisis. "The 
United States had boldly asserted its will--and its might--in 
10the Nuclear Age. The enemy had refused the challenge." 
Nonetheless, Daniel and Hubbell end their account by asking 
the crucial question for the right-wing interpretation: If 
this was a victory, where are the fruits? According to reports, 
the crisis raised high hopes of liberation in Cuba--only to 
have them dashed. Castro and communism remained firmly entrench­
ed in Cuba, and Kennedy's no-invasion pledge left little hope 
for the future. Russian troops, as well as military equipment, 
were still situated in Cuba. Daniel and Hubbell repeat, are 
. . ?11these t h e fruIts of vIctory. Yet, despite these failures, 
Daniel and Hubbell do find some positive aspects in the after­
math of the crISIS. Militarily, the Guantanamo base remained 
secure. On the diplomatic front, there was a new respect for 
the will of America and Kennedy, as Khrushchev noted after the 
crisis to the Chinese, wo claimed that the United States was 
only a paper tiger: "the 'paper tiger' has nuclear teeth.,,12 
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Most importantly, the United States had shown that it would 
not panic under the Soviet's nuclear threats, thus strengthening 
. h' d h . 13our stature In the eyes of bot our ailles an t e Sovlets. 
Though slightly further to the right in his orientation, 
Malcolm E. Smith presents essentially the same arguments in 
Kennedy's Thirteen Great Mistakes in the White House, pUblished 
In 1968. Smith goes further than Daniel and Hubbell in that 
he accuses Kennedy of intentionally ignoring the Cuban situation 
In order to prevent it from becoming a prominent issue in the 
141962 campaign. Nevertheless, Kennedy was forced to confront 
the issue when the U-2 photographs were presented to him, 
compelling him to take decisive action in order to preserve 
U. S. interests. To this extent Smith praises Kennedy, stating, 
"Faced with as terrible a crisis as any ever before thrust upon 
a President, Kennedy did not waver in his 'eyeball to eyeball' 
confrontation with Khrushchev. He met the crisis and forced 
· d d 15 . ,t h e RUSSlan lea er to back own." However, as the crlSlS 
reached its conclusion, Kennedy adopted a fatal policy of 
accomodation. According to Smith, the United States made an 
16
unnecessarily high concession in promising not to invade Cuba. 
Moreover, Smith contends that the informal pledge to take U.S. 
missiles out of Turkey was a costly compromise, citing a 
Defense Department paper published in October of 1962 which 
stated that the Turkish missile bases were vital to the Free 
17World's defenses. Finally, Smith asserts that there continue 
to be reports of intermediate-range nuclear missiles hidden in 
Cuban caves, making, in Smith's opinion, Kennedy's retreat from 
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his initial demand of on-site inspection of Cuba perhaps his 
. 18greatest mlstake. 
After the publication of Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days 
ln 1968, Dean Acheson discussed his differences with the Attorney 
General in an article for Esquire entitled "Dean Acheson's 
Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile 
Affair." Acheson's account is a departure from other right-
wing interpretations in that he does not view the aftermath 
of the crisis as a defeat for the United States. Instead, he 
concentrates on his assertion that, while President Kennedy's 
"leadership, firmness and judgment" were admirable, Kennedy 
19 . h h 'bwas also phenomenally lucky. Wlt t e POSSl le exceptlon. 
of the military, Acheson was the foremost "hawk" at the ExComm 
meetings, maintaining that a limited air strike was the only 
clear and effective solution, yet it "constantly became obscured 
20
and complicated by the trimmings added by the military. 11 
Acheson sharply criticizes the blockade decision, claiming that 
it created possibly even greater dangers than an air strike, 
, , b' . h ., 21wlthout the compensatlng eneflt of removlng t e mlsslles. 
He contends that the military confrontation which the "doves" 
wanted to avoid could still occur when Soviet ships reached 
the blockade and, more importantly, the blockade gave the 
Soviets time to make the missiles operational. 22 While Acheson 
acknowledges President Kennedy's ability to manage the confron­
tation, he refers to Kennedy's attempt to resolve the crisis 
with a series of messages to Khrushchev as "a gamble to the 
point of recklessness," for while the leaders debated work on 
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... . d 23the mlsslle sltes contlnue . Additionally, Acheson finds 
fault with the method of deliberation in the ExComm meetings. 
While some ExComm members applauded the uninhibited nature of 
the discussion, Acheson maintains that this was an improper 
way to operate the National Security Council: "The chief advice 
reaching the President during this critical period came to 
him through his brother, the Attorney GEneral, out of a leader­
less, uninhibited group, many of whom had little knowledge 
either in the military or diplomatic field.,,24 In conclusion, 
Acheson reiterates that, while not wanting to detract from the 
President's laurels, the luck of Khrushchev's befuddlement 
and loss of nerve was essential to the successful resolution 
.. 25
of t h e crlSlS. 
As could be expected, Cuban exiles felt most strongly that 
the Cuban missile crisis represented a lost opportunity. 
Mario Lazo, a Cuban lawyer who was imprisoned by Castro before 
coming to the United States, puts forth a far-right-wing inter­
pretation in his 1968 book Dagger in the Heart. Lazo holds 
that the liberals in the Kennedy administration essentially 
handed over Cuba to the communists with their policy of caution, 
restraint, and accomodation. Lazo blames President Kennedy 
for the Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba, for it was 
Kennedy's inexperience and tendency to vacillate which convinced 
Khrushchev that his endeavor would be successful. 26 Central 
to Lazo's interpretation is his contention that the missile 
crisis was a power confrontation. Lazo maintains that the 
United States could have destroyed every vital Soviet military 
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installation and population center within a few hours, while 
the strike capability of the Soviet Union was negligible; thus, 
the power of the United States was incomparably superior to 
that of the Soviet Union, and, moreover, the leaders of both 
, h' b 27 dnat10ns knew t 1S to e a fact. However, Kennedy followe 
a weak policy of conciliation, according to Lazo: "Although 
Kennedy held the trump cards, he granted the Communist Empire 
a privileged sanctuary in the Caribbean by means of the 'no 
invasion' pledge.,,28 Lazo also sharply criticizes additional 
u.S. concessions, such as Robert Kennedy's pledge to Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Turkish missile bases and, 
in what Lazo describes as a secret concession, President Kennedy's 
orders to crackdown on anti-Castro activities in the United 
., 29States after t h e cr1S1S. In addition, Lazo accuses former 
Kennedy administration officials of trying to cover up details 
of the affair and demands a full disclosure of all communications 
, . d 'd d' h ,,30WhlCh transp1re between Wash1ngton an Moscow ur1ng t e crlS1S. 
The American people, Lazo contends, should understand the 
extent to which the national security of their country was 
compromised, and the Cuban people deserve to know the truth 
regarding the betrayal of their country by the Kennedy adminis­
. 31 , d h h b ..tratlon. In concluslon, Sazo eclares t at t e Cu an m1SS1le 
crisis was not "kennedy's finest hour," but rather "a defeat 
and calamity for the United States and Latin America, and 
32therefore for the Free World." 
Even further to the right is The Losers, an account of 
Soviet and communist penetration in Latin America by Paul D. 
Bethel, at one time a political prisoner under Castro and a 
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former press attache to the American Embassy in Havana. In 
describing President Kennedy and others in his administration 
as liberal isolationists--the losers--Bethel accuses the Pres­
ident of deliberately portraying the crisis as a doomsday 
confrontation so that he could abandon Cuba in exchange for 
' h h ' 33, h ' rapprochement Wlt t e Sovlets. Pr10r to t e confrontatlon, 
Kennedy remained aloof from the rising public and Congressional 
clamor for action in Cuba, making it clear that he would not 
interfere unless the United States was under the threat of an 
immediate attack. Therefore, Kennedy permitted the Soviets 
to do whatever they wanted in Cuba, making a shambles of the 
,34 h " h 'd 11d'Monroe Doctrlne. In Bet el's 0p1n1on, t e Pres1 ent's eVlOUS 
policy" of a blockade amounted to little more than an invitation 
to the Soviets to remove their missiles from Cuba. 35 Bethel 
also cri ti ci zes the belief among the New Frontier "losers" 
that Khrushchev had to be allowed a means to save face; to 
the contrary, Bethel asserts that lIit is practically a religion 
among Communists not to punish those of their leaders who 
withdraw in the face of superior force .... Pursuance of a 
belligerent course under adverse conditions carries with it 
· h' , ,36t h e unpard ona b le r1sk of t reatenJng the commun1st enterprlse. 1I 
Thus, Khrushchev got what he wanted--an ironclad guarantee of 
37 h' ,Cuba. In 1S conclusJon, Bethel even goes so far as to 
suggest that Kennedy's decision to back down from the on-site 
inspection demand was an indication of a possible conspiracy: 
"An inspection team might find that the two nuclear powers had 
b' 38cooperate d 1n' an unb'elleva ly cynlcal deceptlon.'"
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While there is a greater range of extremes in the right­
wing interpretatjon than in that of the traditionalists, most 
writers of this perspective agree on several basic issues. 
Nearly all agree that Kennedy was at least partially to blame 
for the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba, as his lack 
of leadership prior to the crisis convinced Khrushchev that 
he could be successful in this endeavor. Moreover, Kennedy's 
pOlicy of accomodation, despite the overwhelming nuclear 
superiority of the United States, led to the loss of a rare 
opportunity to rid Cuba of Castro and communism, via the no­
invasion pledge. 
The more moderate right-wing interpreters--Daniel and 
Hubbell, Smith and, to a certain degree, Acheson--criticize 
Kennedy's refusal to acknowledge the growing Soviet threat in 
Cuba prior to the confrontation. However, there is general 
agreement that President Kennedy reacted admirably once the 
crisis began, although Acheson attributes the resolution of 
the crisis to luck as much as to Kennedy's abilities. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, however, moderate rjght-wing interpre­
ters criticize the unnecessarily high concession made by 
Kennedy. With the exception of Acheson, who describes the 
resolution of the crisis as a success for the United States, 
other moderate conservatives claim that the no-invasion pledge 
and the informal promise to remove the Turkish missile bases 
led to an overall defeat for the United States, although 
Daniel and Hubbell found some comfort in the increased stature 
of the United States in world oplnlon. 
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For those further to the right, including Lowenthal and, 
to the far-right, Lazo and Bethel, the crisis was a victory 
for the Sovi.ets and a humiliating defeat for the United States. 
President Kennedy was directly to blame for the placement of 
missiles in Cuba due to deliberate efforts to ignore Soviet 
penetration of the iSland. Most importantly, Kennedy's weak 
policy of accomodation, including the quarantine decision and 
the no-invasion pledge, resulted in an explicit retraction of 
the Monroe Doctrine and guaranteed the right of Castro and 
communism to exist in Cuba. 
Chapter IV: The Left Wing Interpretation 
The left-wing interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis 
is a perspective which is at odds with both the traditional 
and the right-wing interpretations. The group advocating this 
perspective is composed of journalists, free-lance writers, 
historians and pOlitical scientists who wrote primarily during 
the 1970s. The main point of this interpretation is the asser­
tion that President Kennedy intentionally raised the Cuban 
affair to the level of crisis and confrontation, thereby 
irresponsibly and recklessly subjecting the world to the threat 
of nuclear war. The liberal interpreters form a much more 
cohesive perspective than that of the right-wing, agreeing on 
most issues. The left-wingers accuse Kennedy of rejecting 
diplomacy, by-passing private negotiations with the soviets 
for a pUblic confrontation. They maintain that the missiles 
In Cuba were a problem of prestige, a political problem, yet 
Kennedy responded with a military act in the form of a blockade. 
Moreover, many left-wing interpreters accuse Kennedy of takjng a 
belligerent course of action in order to prove his toughness 
to the world, thus placing his personal and political needs 
over the security and safety of the nation. Finally, the after­
math of the crisis brought not victory but arrogance, and gave 
the United States the confidence to continue seeking military 
1
solutions to other international problems. 
Roger Hagan, a pacifist and editor of The Correspondent, 
wrote the first left-wing interpretation with the article 
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"Cuba: Triumph or Tragedy?", appearing in the 1963 issue of 
Dissent. Hagan contends that President Kennedy rejected diplo­
macy in favor of a policy of "righteous realpolitik" that only 
confirmed Khrushchev's conviction in the necessity of sending 
Soviet weapons to trouble areas like Cuba, and Kennedy's 
demonstration of force did little to offset this belief. The 
crisis, therefore, was a tragedy in that it served no long­
2 
range goals. According to Hagan, Kennedy faced a choice be­
tween two different types of risk: "He could take a course 
that would risk war, or a course that would risk his political 
. 3 d h d"future and that of hlS party." Hagan respon s to tea mlnlS­
tration's argument that the missiles altered the strategic 
balance of power, claiming that the missiles neither affected 
the U.S. first-strike capacity or its retaliatory second-strike 
capability.4 Moreover, Hagan holds that the administration's 
contention that the missiles in Cuba were offensive while ours 
in Turkey were defensive never surpassed the level of reasoning 
"because we know our intentions are not aggressive."S Yet, 
Hagan maintains, by stating that the missiles in Cuba were 
offensive, Kennedy could accuse the Soviets of deception, thereby 
creating a base of support for military action. 6 However, 
Hagan adds that "the point is not that the National Security 
Council consciously contrived a false rationale while pursuing 
hidden purposes.,,7 Instead, Hagan's point is that, while removal 
of the missiles was desirable in the interest of slowing the 
arms race, the proper course of action was negotiation rather 
than military action, though he does credit Kennedy for his 
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decision to pursue a more moderate military course in the form 
of a blockade. However, in the final analysis, "politics, 
toughness, a sense of nakedness and military peril, a sense 
of being tested, silly rage, all were probably mingled into an 
unanalyzed conviction of the necessity of our action.,,8 
The first far-left-wing interpretation of the missile 
crisis was offered by Leslie Dewart, a Professor of Philosophy 
at the University of Toronto, in a 1965 article published in 
Studies on the Left. In a more radical perspective, Dewart 
holds that President Kennedy purposefully deceived the Soviets 
into thinking that he would accept the deployment of missiles 
in Cuba, when in reality he did not intend to do so. "The U.S. 
plan was to feign surprise at the later 'discovery' of the 
missiles and, then, with the backing of an aroused, 'managed' 
public opinion, to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the 
missiles. 119 Moreover, Dewart sharply criticizes the blockade, 
saying its weaknesses were twofold: diplomatically, it suffered 
from glaring illegality, and, militarily, it was ineffective, 
as it allowed the Soviets to sit and wait, for the weapons 
' b 10were alrea d y In Cu a. According to Dewart, though Khrushchev 
was foolish to place the missiles in Cuba, it was fortunate 
for the world that he rationally elected to end the crisis, 
desplte'ht e catastroph'lC d'lplomatlc'defeat. 11 However, Kennedy's 
victory was less than conclusive, for he was forced to accept 
that an overthrow of Castro's Cuba was no longer an expedient 
, 12pollcy. 
The first "new left" criticism of President Kennedy's 
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handling of the missile crisis to appear in a book was Ramparts 
editor David Horowitz's The Free World Colossus in 1965. While 
Horowitz does not concur with the conspiracy theory of Dewart, 
he does charge that the Kennedy administration, having establish­
ed its missile superiority to the Soviet Union, was waiting 
"for an opportune moment to demonstrate its nuclear superiority 
to the world, and with the prestige thus gained, tip the scales 
of the world power balance. The test was expected to come in 
Berlin, when Cuba presented itself.,,13 Kennedy justified his 
extreme action with the false premise that the Cuban missiles 
altered the strategic balance of power. Horowitz backs his 
accusation with a statement made after the crisis by Deputy 
Defense Secretary Gilpatric: "I don't believe that we were 
under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power, taken 
.. . , 14 .In ltS totallty, after thls than before." Thus, Horowltz 
concludes that the missiles actually represented a threat to 
the political balance of power only, yet Kennedy responded 
with an act of war in the form of a naval blockade. For 
Horowitz, this raises the question of why the administration 
did not follow norman diplomatic procedures upon discovery of 
the missjles: "Why was not the Soviet Ambassador given an 
ultimatum in private, before the presence of the missiles was 
disclosed to the world and the prestige of the United States 
had been put on the line?1I 15 Instead, Horowitz contends, 
Kennedy chose to engage in a test of will with the Soviet Union, 
endangering "not only the lives and destinies of the Soviet and 
American peoples, but hundreds of millions of people in other 
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'h . h ,. 16countrles who ad no role ... In t e crlsls." 
I.F. Stone, a journalistic critic of U.S. foreign policy, 
put forth a strong indictment against President Kennedy in "The 
Brink," a 1966 article in The New York Review of Books. The 
missile crisis, Stone claims, was a game of political prestige 
between Kennedy and Khrushchev to see who would back down first. 
It was the courage of John F. Kennedy which was in question, 
the credibility of his willingness to go all the way if the 
. , d 17 K dmlsslles were not remove. Moreover, Stone charges enne y 
with placing his political interests above the safety of the 
nation. The Congressional elections were only three weeks away, 
and if the missiles were still in Cuba it would certainly have 
been disastrous for the Democrats; thus, there was no time for 
prolonged negotiation--Kennedy had to act if he wanted to pre­
' . 18 
serve h lS party's control ln Congress. In reference to 
Sorenson's sentimental portrait of a worried and distraught 
President, Stone replies, "If Kennedy were so concerned he might 
have sacrificed his chances in the election to try and nego­
tiate. 1I19 Stone also places responsibility for the crisis on 
Khrushchev for foolishly thinking that he could install missiles 
in Cuba and deceive the United States; nonetheless, we are 
indebted to Khrushchev for his decision to favor defussion of 
., h' ,20 d dt h e crlS1S over lS prestlge. In the en , Stone conten s 
that negotiation, however prolonged, would have been preferable 
to the risk of World War III, and, according to him, most 
Americans would have felt the same way: "Given the choice 
between the danger of a Republican majority in the House and 
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the danger of thermonuclear war, voters might conceivably have 
'h" . 'b 21thought the former somewhat less frlg tenlng and lrreverSl Ie." 
In Cold War and Counterrevolution, written in 1972, histor­
ian Richard J. Walton continues the "new left" perspective. 
Walton charges that Kennedy consciously risked nuclear war, a 
decision which was "irresponsible and reckless to a supreme 
degree 
.... 
,,22 While those on the right claim that it was 
President Kennedy's weak Cuban policy which brought on the 
crisis, Walton contends that it was Kennedy's unrelenting hos­
tility toward Cuba which compelled the Soviets to install the 
,. 23 h h d .mlsslles. However, although Khrushc ev a as much rlght 
under international law to place missiles in Cuba as we did In 
Turkey, he was still guilty of being reckless; common sense 
should have told him that Kennedy would not stand for nuclear 
warheads in Cuba. 24 Still, according to Walton, Kennedy was 
far more reckless. While granting that pOlitical realities 
required that Kennedy get rid of the missiles, Walton maintains 
25that he could have done so through diplomatic channels. 
Instead, Kennedy's macho character and fervent anti-communism 
prompted him to demand an unconditional and pUblic surrender 
from a proud and powerfUl adversary.26 In the final analysis, 
Walton maintains that, while many believed that Kennedy had 
won the "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation, Khrushchev in fact 
achieved the objectives he set forth in his decision to place 
the missiles in Cuba; namely, a guarantee of Cuban security 
.., d I 27and removal of U.S. mlSSlles In Turkey an taly." 
The left-wing perspective in continued in The Kennedy 
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Doctrine, written in 1972 by Louise FitzSimons, a former foreign 
affairs officer for the Atomic Energy Commission. FitzSimons 
hOlds that the "Kennedy Doctrine" was based on the President's 
belief, as a ColdWar warrior, that the United States should act 
deci sive ly in world event s. This, coupled with Kennedy's 
concern with prestige and credibility, led him to elevate the 
Cuban situation to a confrontation in public rather than in 
private, thereby dangerously engaging the prestige of both 
sides. 28 FitzSimons, after stating that Kennedy believed the 
missiles in Cuba represented more of a political than a strategic 
alteration in the balance of power, asks why the President was 
compelled to demand unconditional surrender from Khrushchev. 
To answer this question FitzSimons cites several factors: 
Kennedy's history of preoccupation with Cuba as an issue; fear 
that his prestige would suffer and Khrushchev would view him 
as weak; letting Cold War thinking dominate his reasoning and 
prevent any flexibility in dealing with the Soviets; and fears 
that public outrage could result in the removal of his party, 
h ' , 29 or even lmself, from offlce. FitzSimons reaches the conclus­
ion that the Cuban missile crisis was not necessary. Militarily, 
there was not a sUfficient threat to the United States to 
justify the risk of nuclear war. In pOlitical terms, the 
unwillingness to allow any movement from the dominant American 
political position in the world appears unreasonable. Finally, 
negotiation could have led to the neutralization of Cuba, 
resulting in greater long-term benefits for the United States: 
"A neutralized Cuba would have meant the removal of a pOlitical 
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albatross from around the neck of the Kennedy administration 
and would have freed American policy for a more positive approach 
, , . , 30 
to relat10ns w1th Lat1n AmerIca." 
The leftist tradition progressed throughout the 1970s, 
and it included political scientist Bruce Miroff's Pragmatic 
Illusions, published in 1976. Miroff's central theme is that 
President Kennedy constantly transformed local affairs into 
international Cold War crises, each of which became a test of 
'd . d' ." . 31U. S. w1ll an resolve--Inclu 1ng the Cuban m1ss1le cn.S1S. 
While Miroff contends that the Soviets were justified in placing 
missiles in Cuba, he concedes that it was a reckless decision 
on Khrushchev's part, both because it was carried out clandes­
tinely and, more importantly, because it touched on Kennedy's 
, , 32, . h d ' hmost senSItIve spot. Mlroff cla1ms t at esp1te t e fact 
that Kennedy viewed the Soviet move as essentially a political 
one, a test of United STates determination and resolve, he 
never considered diplomatic action, choosing to contront rather 
,33
t h an to negotIate. Miroff suggests that Kennedy may have 
wanted the showdown, and Khrushchev'S Cuban gamble provided 
the perfect opportunity for the confrontation he had long been 
, 34 b' h" d d ' dseek1ng. In acklng up 1S claIm that Kenne y eSlre a test 
of will with Khrushchev, Miroff points to psychological reasons; 
Kennedy's concern with appearing tough, which "amounted to 
. 35. . ,
almost an 0 b seSS1on." Also, M1roff contends that polItIcal 
reasons were a motivating factor as well. Kennedy longed for 
a Cold War victory, and a confrontation in the Caribbean over 
Cuba, where America had an overwhelming military advantage, 
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provided an excellent	 opportunity to decisively stop the tide 
36
of Soviet advancement. Miroff concludes that, after Khrush­
chev's initial recklessness, he acted with prudence and, if 
he had not, Kennedy's triumph would have been a catastrophe. 
In summarizing his interpretation of the crisis, Miroff states: 
Eschewing a diplomatic approach, insisting upon 
the use of force to compel a Russian retreat, Kennedy 
had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war for 
the sake of AMerican prestige and influence .... This 
was hardly the stuff of pOlitical greatnessi in the 
final analysis, Kennedy's conduct in the missile crisis 
was neither responsible nor justifiable. 37 
One of the most recent liberal interpretations of the 
missile crisis comes from Thomas G. Paterson in the 1989 book 
Kennedy's Quest for Victory. Paterson claims that President 
Kennedy had a fixation with Cuba, embarking upon "an unrelenting 
campalgn to monitor, harass, isolate and ultimately destroy 
' ,38Gavana's ra d lcal reglme. II In explaining why Kennedy opted 
for a public military showdown over formal, private negotiations 
and traditional, diplomatic channels, Paterson dismisses several 
reasons put forth by other liberals. Paterson maintains that 
Kennedy was not concerned that the missiles would become oper­
ationa 1 if diplomacy was used, for he knew by the time of his 
television address that many of the missiles were ready to 
39fire. Moreover, politics was not the answer, for the most
 
popular pOlitical position would have been an air strike or
 
. . 40 P d ' d d'
an lnvaSlon. aterson reasons that KEnne y reJecte lplo­
matic talks as an option because of his strong Cold War views, 
his personal hostility toward Castro's Cuba, his desire to 
appear bold and tough, and the feeling of being betrayed by 
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Khrushchev. In the end, though nuclear war was averted, 
Paterson holds that it was a near mlss. Thus, citing a remark 
by Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith that "success in a lottery 
lS no argument for lotteries," Paterson argues that Kennedy's 
"near miss" handling of the Cuban missile crisis should not 
. . 41be held as a mo del for crlSlS management. 
Although the criticisms of the left-wing interpreters of 
the Cuban missile crisis range from restrained to highly crit­
ical, they do form a cohesive interpretation. Nearly all 
left-wing critics maintain that Kennedy's harsh Cuban policy 
contributed to the crisis by convincing Khrushchev it was ~ 
necessary to place missiles in Cuba. Horowitz asserts that 
Kennedy desired a showdown with Khrushchev, while Dewart accuses 
Kennedy of conspiring to deliberately induce the Soviets to 
deploy missiles in Cuba in order to create a crisis. The 
missiles, most liberals contend, did not alter the strategic 
balance of power in the world but only the political balance; 
thus, diplomatic negotiations would have been the proper response 
to the situation. However, Kennedy rejected diplomacy, opting 
instead for a public military confrontation. Left-wing inter­
preters offer a wide range of reasons for Kennedy's action, 
including the President's personal need to demonstrate his 
toughness to the world, the desire for a Cold War victory, and 
Kennedy's determination to preserve Democratic control in 
Congress--none of which were worth the risk of a thermonuclear 
holocaust. Finally, the aftermath of the crisis was not victory 
but arrogance according to the liberals, with Dewart, Walton 
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and FitzSimons claiming that, in the end, the crisis was not 
a conclusive victory for the United States because no long­
range goals were served by Kennedy's actions. 
Chapter V: Another Perpsective 
The continuing scholarly debate over the Cuban missile 
crisis is captured by the three interpretations by traditional­
ists, the right-wing, and the left wing. The traditional 
interpretation is a cohesive one, with writers agreeing on 
most issues. There is a consensus among traditionalists that 
intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet 
Union made serious miscalculations, thus resulting in the crisis. 
Also, traditionalists agree that President Kennedy was forced 
to respond out of necessity to the situation, and the blockade 
was the perfect flexible response. Finally, the traditionalists 
praise President Kennedy as a calm, responsible leader. 
The two revisionist interpretations, from the right-wing 
and the left-wing, provide a quite different perspective. For 
conservatives, Kennedy's weak pre-crisis policy toward Cuba 
convinced Khrushchev that he could successfully deploy missiles 
on the iSland. Once the crisis began, the right-wing accuses 
Kennedy of following a policy of accomodation, resulting in a 
defeat for the United States. Provided with a golden opportunity 
to rid Cuba of Castro and communism, Kennedy instead made a 
no-invasion pledge to end the crisis, thus guaranteeing that 
communism would remain in the Western Hemisphere. Writing from 
the left-wing perspective, most liberals agree that Kennedy was 
partially responsible for the initiation of the crisis; however, 
while conservatives blame his weak Cuban pOlicy for this, 
Jt liberals maintain that it was Kennedy's harsh, unreasonable 
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stand toward Cuba which forced Khrushchev to install the missiles.4 The liberals view Kennedy as a man who felt the need to prove 
his strength to the world; thus, he took what was essentially 
a political problem, an issue of prestige, and elevated it 
to a crisis level by imposing a military solution, in the form 
of a blockade. The aftermath of the crisis was arrogance, with 
Kennedy having forced Khrushchev to backdown to him before 
the world. 
An accurate interpretation of the Cuban missile crlSlS 
must draw from a wide range of perspectives, and certainly 
the most plausible interpretation would be a combination of 
both the traditional and the left-wing perspective. Kennedy's 
pre-crisis pOlicies were neither harsh nor weaki in a heated 
domestic political climate, with many pOlitical opponents 
demanding action against Soviet encroachments in Cuba, Kennedy 
had embarked upon a pOlicy of reason and responsibility, refusing 
to act without conclusive evidence. 
Once this evidence was obtainged, the situation was radically 
altered. Kennedy, after months of maintaining that there was 
no evidence of an offensive military build up in Cuba and stating 
that he would respond forcefully to such action, had no choice-­
he ad to react to the situation. The country simply would 
not have tolerated Soviet nuclear warheads ninety milles from 
Key WEst. Had Kennedy not acted, all popular support, not 
to mention pOlitical support, would have eroded from beneath 
him. The public trust and faith would have been shattered, 
and Kennedy would have been fatally crippled as President. 
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Having determined that a response to the Soviet threat was 
necessary, the debate turned to finding an appropriate option. 
While some traditionalists hold that the option of using 
diplomacy as an initial response received significant consideration, 
the man who made the final decision, President Kennedy, never 
seriously considered this option. Several crisis writers, 
including Sorenson and Schlesinger, admit that Kennedy showed 
little interest in diplomatic negotiations. At the first ExComm 
meeting, Kennedy declared, "We I re certai nly go:i ng ... to take 
,. 1 
out t hese ...mlsslles." When McNamara mentioned that diplomacy 
might precede military action, the President immediately switched 
the discussion to another question: How long would it take to 
., 'd?2get an alr strlke organlze . 
The major argument against diplomatic action as an initial~. 
response was the belief among most ExComm members that more 
forceful action was demanded by the Soviet action. However, 
it was not as if an initial diplomatic response to the Soviets 
would have eliminated a military option later; indeed, it was 
possible that a military option could have been avoided entirely 
if diplomacy had been tried first, and, if Kennedy had been 
forced to respond militarilY, he could have been fully assured 
that he had made every possible effort to peacefully resolve 
the crisis. 
The other major argument against diplomacy as a response 
was that it would have allowed the initiative to pass to the 
Soviets. Kennedy felt that it was vital to surprise the Soviets 
with the news of the discovery of the missiles in order to 
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allow the United States to control the events of the crisis. 
However, it would seem that the naval blockade, to a certain 
degree, also allowed the initiative to pass to the Soviets. 
Once the blockade was implemented, the Soviets were in control 
of the situation; the missiles were already in Cuba, so they 
could afford to sit and wait. The United States was eventually 
forced to resort to other means, namely diplomatic channels, 
In order to resolve the crisis. 
There were three other arguments against a diplomatic 
appeal. First, there was the concern that the missiles would 
become operational while diplomatic debate raged on. However, 
the blockade did not solve this problem either, for it 
could only stop further shipments of armaments, doing nothing 
to halt the continuing work on the missile sites in Cuba. 
Moreover, it was wntirely possible that some of the missile 
sites were already operational by the time that the blockade 
was implemented. Secondly, some argued that the fact that the 
blockade would at least stop further arms shipments made it 
a superior option to diplomatic action; however, there were 
already enough missiles in Cuba to inflict unnacceptable levels 
of destruction upon the United States. A final argument against 
diplomatic action was the contention that a letter demanding 
the withdrawal of the missiles would constitute the type of 
ultimatum that no great power could accept. Yet, was the naval 
blockade not an ultimatum--a public ultimatum, no less, a 
challenge to Khrushchev before the world? It would seem that 
a private diplomatic appeal would have benn less offensive than 
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a public military challenge. 
President Kennedy also rejected the suggestion, put forth 
by Stevenson and journalist Walter Lippmann, among others, that 
the Unjted States trade its Jupiter missiles in Turkey for 
removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. However, later in the 
crisis Kennedy was willing to negotiate with the Soviets on 
just this issue. In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobynin, 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy conveyed a message from the 
President regarding the missile question. Although Kennedy 
majntainged that there could be no public quid pro quo about 
the missiles, he stated, "The President had been anxious to 
remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period 
of time. He had ordered their removal some time 0.;·0 and i ':. 
4
 ,,~as our judgment that, wi thin a short time after this cr lsis
 
was over 1 those missi les would be gone. ,.3 Most advocat.es of 
the quarantine maintain that this type of negotiation could 
only have been successful after the implementation of a blockadG. 
However, while it is true that the threat of retaljation posed 
by the intense build up of American air strike and invasl0n 
forces (over 200,000 troops were assembled in Florida, ~long 
with many squadrons of fi.ghters) certainly must have affected 
the frame of mind of the Soviets regarding the situation, the 
b:ockade really had nothing to do with the display of American 
mil~tary strength. 4 Why would it not have been possjble to 
make a diplomatic appeal from the outset, with the military 
back-drop already in place? 
The most rational thinking in the crisis was put forth by 
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Chjp Bohlen. He maintained that the missiles had to be removed4 
from Cuba; however, while military means had to be considered, 
so that they would be readily available if needed, a diplomatic 
appeal shoud be tried first. 5 In essence, President Kennedy 
reversed the proper order of responses, backtracking to a 
diplomatjc appeal because the blockade had failed to illicit 
a favorable solution and an air strike still seemed to be too 
rjsky of an option. To Kennedy's credit, he did initially choose 
the most moderate military response with the blockade option, 
and, once the crisis began, Kennedy behaved in a highly controlled 
and rational manner, much in the way he had before the crisis. 
He remainged in command of all proceedings throughout the crosos. 
and wjsely refrained from overreacting to potentially volatile 
4 events, most notably in his decision not to retaljate after the 
shooting down of Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson. 
Why, then, did Kennedy initially decide on a military 
response, only to later resolve the crjsis through secret dip­
lomacy of a nature which had been earlier suggested? While 
it is impossible to know what Kennedy's reasons were, his 
initial reaction to the news of the Soviet action in Cuba 
offers a clue: "He can't fo thjs to me!,,6 Kennedy interpreted 
Khrushchev'S action as both a personal deception and a personal 
challenge. This combined sense of anger at being lied to and 
need to prove himself compelled Kennedy to move forcefully 
against Khrushchev~ Kennedy was unable to consider anything 
less than a military response. However, while this reaction 
is certainly understandable, Kennedy should have tempered his 
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emotions long enough to have at least given proper consideration 
to diplomatic options. Fortunately, this momentary lapse of 
judgment subsided, and Kennedy's responsible leadership through­
out the remainder of the crisis, coupled with Khrushchev's 
rational decision (following his earlier irrational one) to 
remove the missiles, combined with a dash of the Irish luck 
to thankfully keep the world from ever knowing the answer to 
the most grave question of the Cuban missile crisis: What 
would have happened to us all if the Soviets had refused to 
back down? 
t
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